Country of origin |
United States |
Entered service |
1983 |
Crew |
3 men |
Launch trailer dimensions and weight |
Number of missiles |
4 |
Weight |
36 t |
Length |
19.8 m |
Width |
2.44
m |
Height |
~ 3 m |
Missile |
Missile length (without booster) |
5.56 m |
Missile diameter |
0.52 m |
Missile launch weight |
1 200 kg |
Warhead weight |
176 kg |
Warhead type |
Nuclear, 150 kT yield |
Range of fire |
2 500 km |
CEP |
~ 30 m |
Mobility |
Engine |
MAN D2866 KFG diesel |
Engine power |
360 hp |
Maximum road speed |
80 - 90 km/h |
Range |
~ 800 km |
Maneuverability |
Gradient (with trailer) |
~ 20% |
Side slope |
? |
Vertical step |
? |
Trench |
? |
Fording |
~ 1.2 m |
|
The BGM-109G Gryphon was
a cruise missile operated by the US Air Force (USAF) during the late
1980s and early 1990s. It was essentially a ground-launched
BGM-109A Tomahawk, and was also designated as the Ground
Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), sometimes awkwardly referred-to as "Glickum".
Fortunately, the Gryphon has never been launched in anger, nor with
a live nuclear warhead.
The Gryphon is the product of the GLCM program, initiated by
the USAF in 1971 as an effort to develop a replacement for the
obsolete MGM-13 Mace cruise missile. The new weapon envisioned would
be able to carry a nuclear warhead out to a range exceeding 2 000
km, using an economical small turbofan engine and Terrain Contour
Matching (TERCOM) guidance. Development work moved slowly over the
next several years, likely owing to a strong institutional bias
against cruise missiles in the USAF (see the pages on the
Tomahawk and the AGM-86A ALCM for further context), but matters
changed quickly in 1976, with the entry of the
RSD-10 Pioneer (Western designation SS-20 Saber) Intermediate-Range
Ballistic Missile (IRBM) into service with the Soviet forces in
Europe. The Pioneer missile represented a serious complication for
NATO's nuclear strategy, as it allowed Soviet forces to rapidly
strike any NATO military installation in Europe using road-mobile
launchers, from the relative safety of rear areas inside the Soviet
Union. Under intense political pressure from West German Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt in January of 1977, the US government in turn
committed itself to counter to the new IRBM threat.
Though behind the scenes, these events were driven by
political intrigue that had very little to do with NATO defense.
This wasn't Chancellor Schmidt's "first rodeo" with the US
government in this capacity, as he had just prior agreed to purchase
the
E-3 Sentry airborne early warning aircraft (whose purpose at
that time was to be an early warning system for Soviet IRBM
launches, not as an airborne C3I system) for the Luftwaffe, only if
the US government had committed itself to arming the
M1
Abrams tank with a 120 mm gun using the same ammunition as the
Leopard
2 tank (which ultimately resulted in the creation of the
M1A1
Abrams).
Military politics were involved as well. The USAF until this
time saw the US Navy's Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM), which
became the BGM-109 Tomahawk) program only as unwanted competition
for their share of the nuclear budget, and preferred to have the
AGM-86 for the ALCM program then in development. However, the SLCM
was the only mature surface-launchable cruise missile available to
meet the GLCM requirement. The GLCM was also part of a bureaucratic
turf war with the US Army, over who would control the land-based
intermediate-range nuclear arena, with the Army's competing weapon
being the MGM-31C Pershing 2 IRBM. While the USAF in the GLCM
offered Congress a weapon that was promised to slip nuclear warheads
under the enemy's radar and air defenses, the Army's Pershing 2 was
claimed to be so fast the enemy wouldn't have time to react before
it hit them. Neither faction ended up overthrowing the other as
intended in this arena, as Congress ultimately decided to buy
several-hundred of each weapon.
An even deeper layer of intrigue was an ongoing series of
negotiations between the US and the USSR over the possibility of
eliminating all of both nation's land-based intermediate-range
nuclear warhead delivery systems. Dubbed the Intermediate Nuclear
Forces (INF) talks, this dialogue had taken place since mid-1979,
and offered a "Zero Option" that --- if taken by both sides ---
would significantly ease tensions between East and West, and also
eliminate the intractable problem of how to counter and fend-off the
IRBM threat. However, the West was deeply divided over whether or
not to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear weapons before an INF
Treaty could be created. The "Hawks" on the matter insisted that no
matter what the outcome of the negotiations, the US military had to
show its commitment to NATO and its resolve by deploying the GLCM
and Pershing 2 first, while the "Doves" countered that doing so
might provoke the USSR into abandoning the INF talks, and that if
they don't, the new weapons would have to be retired and destroyed
within a few years (or possibly months) of finally being deployed.
As the talks continued, so did the development of the GLCM and the
Pershing 2.
Despite the claimed urgency of the threat, work on the GLCM
proceeded slowly (especially in light of the relative maturity of
the Tomahawk). The first launch from a trailer took place in May of
1980, and training for GLCM personnel began at Davis-Monthan Air
Force Base in Arizona on July 1st 1981 with the re-activation of the
868th Tactical Missile Training Squadron, though developmental
testing was still incomplete, and operational testing still hadn't
begun. The first guided launch of a GLCM took place in February of
1982, while operational testing finally began in May of 1982, with
the final developmental flight being conducted on June 27th 1983;
later that year, initial operational capacity was declared by the
USAF, and at some point the GLCM was officially re-designated as the
BGM-109G Gryphon. Despite the fact that the Gryphon still wasn't yet
operable at the time, foreign deployments began in 1982.
In both form and function, the Gryphon is essentially the
same as the Tomahawk, with the same layout and performance. As with
the BGM-109A Tomahawk, the Gryphon was guided by terrain following
radar, using terrain contour matching technology. For further
details on appearance, composition, propulsion, performance, and
guidance, see the
Tomahawk page.
Interestingly, though the Gryphon was launched from a trailer
in the field, largely as part of US Army operations, the vehicles
and missiles were owned and crewed by the USAF. The tractor vehicle
normally used to pull the launcher trailer was an M1001 (US version
of the German
MAN
KAT 1 8x8 heavy truck).
While the ubiquitous Tomahawk employed a wide range of
warheads, the Gryphon had only one; the W84. This was a
thermonuclear warhead with a variable yield; it could be
"dialed-down" to produce a blast as tiny as only 0.2 kT, or one a
colossal as 150 kT. It is unknown if the BGM-109G Gryphon was ever
meant to have a conventionally-armed version, but none was ever
fielded.
The BGM-109G
Gryphon was mired in controversy since its inception, and it
attracted a wide range of opposition during the 1980s. In addition
to the regular crowd of peace activists and promoters of nuclear
disarmament, the driving forces behind the creation and deployment
of the Gryphon also had to contend with countless thousands of irate
European locals, who were less than thrilled at being "protected" by
nearby nuclear missile launchers (meaning that in the event of an
accident with a Gryphon missile, or a Warsaw Pact nuclear attack on
the launch sites, the adjacent population would likely suffer a
terrible death toll), and protests hounded the Gryphon’s European
deployments through the remainder of their tenure. There were also
separate political factions in both the East and West that advocated
the elimination of all land-based intermediate-range nuclear
weapons, and an ongoing process of negotiating the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces Treaty to eliminate all of these weapons, which
included the Gryphon. The US Military Reform Movement opposed the
Gryphon simply because the US military's own documentation put the
reliability and functionality of the missile in doubt (details of
these problems are described at length on the
BGM-109 Tomahawk page), though little press attention was paid
to the question of whether or not the Gryphon was a "Paper Tiger".
A total of seven USAF formations were equipped with the
BGM-109G Gryphon. These were the 868th Tactical Missile
Training Group (TMTG) at Davis-Monthan air force base in Arizona (since 1982), the
501st Tactical Missile Wing (TMW) at Royal Air Force's Greenham Common in the UK
(since July 1982), the 487th TMW at Comiso air base in Italy (since June
1983), the 485th TMW at Florennes air base in Belgium (since August 1984),
the 38th TMW at Wueschheim air base in West Germany (since April 1985),
the 303rd TMW at Royal Air Force's Molesworth in the UK (since December 1986), and
the 486th TMW at Woensdrecht air base in the Netherlands (since August
1987).
Ultimately, the predictions of the pundits came true, and the
deployment of the GLCM and Pershing 2 did in fact provoke the Soviet
Union into abandoning the INF talks in November of 1983. The US
government was accused of trying to pull a "bait and switch", as the
Soviet officials stormed out of negotiations --- though few tears
were shed by the US military as they gained prestige from their
latest political victory, defense industry as they profited from it,
nor by their Soviet counterparts who had a new "threat" to fuel
their own private agendas. In short, rather than achieving the
promise to making the West safer, the contribution of the GLCM and
Pershing 2 was instead to preserve the threat posed by the RSD-10
Pioner missiles, shift their aim increasingly more toward the
densely-populated areas where GLCM and Pershing 2 were located, and
set back East-West nuclear relations by almost a decade.
INF negotiations finally recommenced in March of 1985, after
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet managed to
convince both parties to return to the bargaining table. These
discussions proved more fruitful, as indicated by the Soviet Army's
withdrawal of three of its nine RSD-10 Pioner squadrons deployed to Eastern
Europe, though promoters of the GLCM and Pershing 2 were quick to
declare that the USSR was creating a ruse (as seen in the September
26th 1985 Times article, "Soviet Missile Trick Suspected"). Though
by the September of 1987, the fabled "Zero Option" was finally
agreed upon, and the INF Treaty was formally signed by both the US
and Soviet governments on December 8th 1987. The withdrawal from
service and subsequent destruction of all affected US and Soviet
weapons slowly followed, and by the early 1990s, no ground-launched
intermediate-range nuclear weapons remained in either nation's
inventory --- including the BGM-109G Gryphon.
The Gryphon's withdrawal from Europe (and soon after from
active service) began in 1988, with the last missile being destroyed
or permanently disabled by 1991. Only 8 Gryphon’s were retained,
only for display purposes, and these are no longer operable. At
present, the W84 warhead inventory is inactive and in storage. While
they could be reactivated, it is doubtful that they would be of much
use as far as the Tomahawk missile series is concerned, as no
surviving models are configured to carry a nuclear warhead.
While a BGM-109 variant launched from a TEL trailer or
vehicle still has tremendous military potential even today, it is no
longer feasible given the US government's commitment to the INF
Treaty; not even for such missiles armed with conventional weapons,
given the Gryphon's natural potential for delivering a nuclear
warhead.
This may not be the end of the Gryphon's story however, as
Russia and the US have both openly accused one another of violation
the INF Treaty in recent years. If the matter sours further,
ground-launched weapons like the GLCM may yet find their way back
into the US inventory.
Similar weapons
BGM-109A Tomahawk: This missile is virtually identical to the
BGM-109 Gryphon, apart from being launched from surface ships and
submarines rather than a land-based trailer, and carrying a
different model of nuclear warhead.
AGM-86B ALCM: A contemporary USAF nuclear-tipped cruise missile,
the ALCM (Air Launched Cruise Missile) was the airborne counterpart
of the Gryphon. Given interservice politics at the time, it is
probable that if the USAF could have found some way to launch the
ALCM from the ground ("BGM-86B Gryphon"?), they would not have
acquired a variant of the Navy's competing Tomahawk missile. See the
articles on the
ALCM and
Tomahawk for further insight.
RK-55 Relief: This missile was the Soviet counterpart of the
BGM-109G Gryphon, and was launched from an 8x8 TEL vehicle. It could
carry a nuclear warhead just like the Gryphon, but
conventionally-armed examples were fielded as well. Production of
the RK-55 Relief had only just begun when the INF Treaty was
ratified, so only 80 missiles were completed, none of which were
deployed by the time of their destruction in compliance with the
treaty. The Relief was designated SSC-X-4 Slingshot by the West.
S-10 Granat: This is a Soviet submarine-launched cruise
missile. While the Gryphon had a counterpart launched from
submarines, so did the RK-55 Relief, in the form of the S-10
(code-named SS-N-21 Sampson by the West). As naval missiles were not
subject to the 1987 INF Treaty, the S-10 remained in production,
development, and operational service, and it is still used by the
Russian Navy as of 2017.
9M728 (Western
reporting name SSC-7) and 9M729 (SSC-8): These are new Russian
cruise missiles based on the S-10 technology. The 9M728 was first deployed in
2017, while the improved 9M729 with longer range followed in 2018. These missiles are used by
modified
Iskander systems. The 9M728 missile has a range of 490 km,
though there were estimations that its actual range could be up to 1
500 km. In fact the improved 9M729 missile demonstrated a range in
excess of 500 km during its test launch.
There are estimations that the new missile could have a range of
around 2 000-2 500 km. Some sources even estimate that its actual
range could be up to 5 500 km. Both of these
missiles can carry
low-yield nuclear warheads. This sparked accusations by the US government
that Russia had violated the INF Treaty --- though Russia retorted
that because the US had previously deployed Mk.41 VLS launchers as
part of the "Aegis Ashore" system in Eastern Europe (which can
launch BGM-109 Tomahawks), Washington D.C. had effectively dissolved
the treaty. This led the United States to withdraw from the 1987 INF
treaty in 2019.
Kh-55: Code-named AS-15 Kent by the West, the Kh-55 is an
air-launched cruise missile very similar in design to the RK-55 (in
fact, Western intelligence and news sources had mistakenly assumed
for some time that the Kh-55 was directly derived from the RK-55).
There are both conventionally-armed and nuclear versions of this
missile.
Soumar: Unlicensed copy of the Kh-55 manufactured by Iran.
Unlike the original Kh-55, the Soumar is ground-launched.
Meshkat: This is a more recent Iranian missile based on the
Kh-55, which is believed to have increased range over the Soumar.
Babur: First entering service with the Pakistani armed forces
in 2005, the Babur is uncannily similar to the Gryphon (it is even
carried on a trailer with four launch containers), though it has a
much shorter range, and both conventional and nuclear warheads. A
naval version for use in Pakistani submarines is also under
development. A ground-launched version of the Babur-III has a 450 km
range.
Nirbhay:
This weapon is India's answer to the Babur, boasting a longer range
and higher flight speed, though it is problematic and protracted
development has so far precluded operational service.
Hyunmoo 3: Extremely similar in design to the Gryphon and the
Tomahawk, the South Korean Hyunmoo 3 is only armed with a
conventional warhead, and has a shorter range. There are
air-launched, surface-launched, and submarine-launched versions of
this missile.
 |
Article by
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